This paper considers the problem of combining belief functions obtained from not necessarily independent sources of information. It introduces two combination rules for the situation in which no assumption is made about the dependence of the information sources. These two rules are based on cautious combinations of plausibility and commonality functions, respectively. The paper studies the properties of these rules and their connection with Dempster's rules of conditioning and combination and the minimum rule of possibility theory.
Introduction
A central theme of Dempster-Shafer theory [41, 53] is the combination of the information obtained from different sources. The information obtained from a source is described by a belief function, and the belief functions corresponding to independent sources of information can be combined by means of Dempster's rule. The problem is that it is usually not clear if Dempster's rule is applicable, because the meaning of the independence of the information sources is very abstract (this holds for all interpretations of belief functions).
Dempster-Shafer theory allows the description of partial or complete ignorance, since the belief not accorded to a proposition does not have to be accorded to the negation of that proposition. Hence, it is fully in the spirit of the theory to allow ignorance also about the dependence of the information sources: the present paper studies the combination of belief functions in the extreme case of complete ignorance about the dependence of the information sources. Several combination rules have been recently suggested for that extreme case: the rule proposed by Cattaneo [1] replaces the independence assumption with an assumption of maximal consistency (that is, minimal conflict), but is computationally too demanding for many applications; the rule studied by Denoeux [11] (based on the concept of weight of evidence) satisfies important properties, but has some difficulties with non-separable belief functions; finally, the rule suggested by Destercke et al. [13] generalizes the minimum rule of possibility theory, but does not respect the fundamental equivalence between belief functions and their vacuous extensions. The combination rules proposed in the present paper are closely related to these three rules, without being subject to the above weaknesses.
An example of a situation in which the assumption of independence of the information sources leads to absurd results is the generalization of Bayes' theorem studied in [1, Section 5] (see also [46, Subsection 5.2] ). In fact, in that situation the conflict of the combination appears to play the role of a measure of disagreement between the involved belief functions, and the conflict of Dempster's rule is not a good measure of disagreement (see for instance [34] ). A much better measure of disagreement among belief functions is the minimal conflict defined in Section 2 of the present paper. More generally, Section 2 contains some mathematical definitions and results, in particular on specializations of belief functions and on two classes of Fréchet bounds. The proofs of the theorems are given in Appendix A.
In general, the information sources cannot be independent, because the pieces of information obtained from them are about the same topic, and the independence assumption can thus lead to partial inconsistency (that is, conflict).
Hence, the result of Dempster's rule should be interpreted as an approximation by a belief function of the conflictual combination actually resulting from the independence assumption. This is the subject of Section 3, and is important for the justification of the combination rules proposed in Section 5 for the situation in which no assumption is made about the dependence of the information sources, since the results of those rules are approximations by belief functions of most cautious descriptions of the combined information. The rules of Section 5 satisfy many important properties, discussed in Section 4 in relation to the vast literature on combination rules for belief functions.
Some mathematical definitions and results
Let S be a finite, nonempty set. The complement of A ⊆ S in S is denoted by A, while 2 A and |A| denote the power set and the cardinality of A, respectively. An ordered partition of A ⊆ S into n ≥ 1 subsets is an n-tuple (B 1 , . . . , B n ) ∈ (2 A ) n of pairwise disjoint subsets of A whose union is A (note that the non-emptiness of the B i 's is not assumed). Let OP n (A) denote the set of all ordered partitions of A into n subsets. respectively, for all A ⊆ S . The value Bel(A) is the total non-conflictual belief mass assigned to A or its subsets, while the value Pl(A) is the total belief mass not assigned to A or its subsets. Hence, Bel ≤ Pl (in this paper, expressions involving functions without explicit arguments are to be interpreted pointwise), Bel(∅) = Pl(∅) = 0, and Bel(A) + Pl(A) = 1 − m(∅) for all A ⊆ S . Moreover, Pl ∈ MS 0 (S ) and Pl is 2-alternating, while Q ∈ AQ 1 (S ) and Q satisfies A⊆S (−1) |A| Q(A) = m(∅) (see for example [41, page 42] ). When m x is a bba, then Bel x , Pl x , and Q x denote the belief, plausibility, and commonality functions associated with m x , respectively.
A refinement of S is a pair (R, r) where R is a finite set and r : S → 2 R \{∅} is a mapping such that the images of the elements of S are pairwise disjoint and their union is R (that is, the images of the elements of S build a nonempty partition of R). When m is a bba on 2 S and (R, r) is a refinement of S , the vacuous extension of m to 2 R by means of r is the bba m ↑(R,r) on 2 R such that m ↑(R,r) (∅) = m(∅) and m
↑(R,r)
x∈A r(x) = m(A) for all nonempty A ⊆ S . The plausibility and commonality functions associated with m ↑(R,r) are Pl •r and Q •r, respectively, wherer :
The focal sets of a bba m on 2 S are the A ⊆ S such that m(A) > 0. The core C(m) of a bba m on 2 S is the union of its focal sets; that is, C(m) is the smallest A ⊆ S such that Pl(A) = 0. A bba m is said to be consonant if its focal sets are nested. The contour function π : S → [0, 1] associated with a consonant bba m on 2 S satisfies π(x) = Pl({x}) = Q({x}) for all x ∈ S ; therefore, Pl(A) = max x∈A π(x) and Q(A) = min x∈A π(x), for all nonempty A ⊆ S . The simple bba m A,α on 2 S is the consonant bba defined by m A,α (A) = α and m A,α (S ) = 1 − α, where A ⊂ S and α ∈ [0, 1]. In particular, m A,0 does not depend on A, and is called the vacuous bba on 2 S .
Joint belief assignments and specializations
Let m 1 , . . . , m n be n ≥ 1 bba's on 2 S . A joint belief assignment (jba) with marginals m 1 , . . . , m n is a function
for all A ⊆ S and all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (hence, in particular, B 1 ,...,B n ⊆S J(B 1 , . . . , B n ) = 1). Let J(m 1 , . . . , m n ) denote the set of all jba's with marginals m 1 , . . . , m n . A jba J on (2 S ) n induces a bba m J on 2 S defined by
for all A ⊆ S . The induced bba m J is obtained from J by assigning the belief mass J(B 1 , . . . , B n ) to the set B 1 ∩· · ·∩ B n , for all B 1 , . . . , B n ⊆ S . A bba m on 2 S can be interpreted as the probability distribution of a random subset X of S with respect to some probability measure P, where (Ω, A, P) is some underlying probability space and X : Ω → 2 S is a random object. The bba m is normal if and only if X is nonempty a.s. (that is, P{X ∅} = 1), and normalizing m corresponds to conditioning P on {X ∅}. With this interpretation, Bel(A) = P{X ⊆ A, X ∅}, Pl(A) = P{X ∩ A ∅}, and
If the bba's m 1 , . . . , m n on 2 S are interpreted as the probability distributions of the random subsets X 1 , . . . , X n of S , respectively, then the jba's J ∈ J(m 1 , . . . , m n ) correspond to the possible joint probability distributions of X 1 , . . . , X n , and m J to the resulting probability distribution of X 1 ∩ · · · ∩ X n . In particular, the jba I corresponding to the independence of X 1 , . . . , X n is defined by I(B 1 , . . . , B n ) = m 1 (B 1 ) · · · m n (B n ) for all B 1 , . . . , B n ⊆ S ; in this case, the commonality function Q I associated with the induced bba m I satisfies, for all A ⊆ S ,
A bba m s on 2 S is a specialization of a bba m on 2 S if there is a jba J ∈ J(m s , m) such that J(B s , B) > 0 implies for all A ⊆ S . Hence, a specialization of a bba on 2 S is obtained by transferring some belief mass from A to some of its subsets, for all A ⊆ S . As a consequence, if m s is a specialization of m, then Pl s ≤ Pl and Q s ≤ Q, and all specializations of m s are also specializations of m.
Let S(m) denote the set of all specializations of a bba m. It can be easily proved that
Bel s and Q = max
Hence, for each A ⊆ S , the value Pl(A) is the maximum amount of non-conflictual belief mass that can be assigned to A or its subsets by specializing m, while Q(A) is the maximum amount of belief mass that can be assigned to A by specializing m. The following result points out the strong relationship between common specializations and jba's.
Theorem 1. Let m 1 , . . . , m n be n ≥ 1 bba's on 2 S . A bba on 2 S is a common specialization of m 1 , . . . , m n if and only if it is a specialization of a bba m J induced by some jba J with marginals m 1 , . . . , m n ; that is,
Two binary operators
The binary operators and ∧ on the set of all real functions on 2 S are defined by
respectively, for all A ⊆ S and all real functions µ, ν on 2 S . It can be easily checked that and ∧ are commutative and associative, with
for all n ≥ 1, all A ⊆ S , and all real functions µ 1 , . . . , µ n on 2 S . Hence, in particular,
for all n ≥ 1 and all real functions µ 1 , . . . , µ n on 2 S such that µ 1 (∅) = · · · = µ n (∅) = 0. That is, µ 1 · · · µ n is bounded above by the pointwise minimum of µ 1 , . . . , µ n , if µ 1 (∅) = · · · = µ n (∅) = 0, and this is the case in particular when µ 1 , . . . , µ n ∈ MS 0 (S ).
Theorem 2.
is a commutative and associative binary operator on MS 0 (S ). Moreover, for all µ, ν ∈ MS 0 (S ), if (R, r) is a refinement of S , then (µ •r) (ν •r) = (µ ν) •r; and if µ ≤ ν, then µ ν = µ.
The following simple result is an analogue of Theorem 2 for the pointwise minimum operator ∧.
Theorem 3. ∧ is a commutative and associative binary operator on AQ 1 (S ). Moreover, for all µ, ν ∈ AQ 1 
Fréchet bounds
Let m 1 , . . . , m n be n ≥ 1 bba's on 2 S and let A be a subset of S . If m 1 , . . . , m n are interpreted as the probability distributions of the random subsets X 1 , . . . , X n of S , respectively, then max J∈J(m 1 ,...,m n ) Pl J (A) and max
are the maximum values of P{X 1 ∩ · · · ∩ X n ∩ A ∅} and P{A ⊆ X 1 ∩ · · · ∩ X n }, respectively, over all possible joint probability distributions of X 1 , . . . , X n . Such maxima are called Fréchet bounds in probability theory (see for example [39] ). The following theorem states in particular that (Pl 1 · · · Pl n )(A) corresponds to the first of the two Fréchet bounds (3) when n ≤ 2, and bounds it from above when n ≥ 3.
Moreover, the above inequality is actually an equality when n ≤ 2; that is, in particular,
The equality between the first of the two Fréchet bounds (3) and (Pl 1 · · · Pl n )(A) when n ≤ 2 can be deduced from a theorem by Strassen [49, Theorem 11] , who noted that his theorem cannot be straightforwardly extended to the case with n ≥ 3 (see also [44] ). In fact, the following counterexample implies that for no n ≥ 3 the inequality in the first part of Theorem 4 is always an equality. Example 1. Choose n ≥ 3 and define S = {1, . . . , n}. For each i ∈ S let m i be the bba on 2 S assigning the belief mass 
In spite of the simplicity of Example 1, no difference between max J∈J(m 1 ,...,m n ) Pl J and Pl 1 · · · Pl n has been observed in thousands of randomly generated numerical examples (with various generating probability distributions). This suggests that in general (Pl 1 · · · Pl n )(A) is a very good upper approximation of the first of the two Fréchet bounds (3) . The second one is simpler: it corresponds to (Q 1 ∧ · · · ∧ Q n )(A), as implied by the following result. 
Minimal conflict
The minimal conflict of n ≥ 1 bba's m 1 , . . . , m n on 2 S is the value
where the second equality is implied by Theorem 4, since m(∅) = 1 − Pl(S ). Hence, Theorem 4 implies also
As noted above, in general 1 − (Pl 1 · · · Pl n )(S ) seems to be a very good lower approximation of c min (m 1 , . . . , m n ). The second part of Theorem 4 implies that the minimal conflict of the bba's m 1 , m 2 on 2
In the case with |S | a power of 2 and m 1 , m 2 normal, the expression (4) was proved directly in [1, Proposition 2] . The equality between the first of the two Fréchet bounds (3) and (Pl 1 · · · Pl n )(A) when n ≤ 2 can be easily deduced from this result. The minimal conflict c min (m 1 , . . . , m n ) ∈ [0, 1] can be interpreted as a measure of disagreement between the bba's m 1 , . . . , m n . The following theorem collects some important properties of this measure of disagreement. 
On the assumption of independence of the information sources
In Dempster-Shafer theory, a piece of information about the uncertain value of x ∈ S is usually described by a normal bba m on 2 S : for each A ⊆ S , the value m(A) is the total belief mass assigned to the proposition "x ∈ A" without being assigned to any more specific proposition. A central theme of the theory is the combination of the information obtained from different sources; that is, the combination of several normal bba's on 2 S (describing the information obtained from different sources) into a single normal bba on 2 S (describing the combined information). If the normal bba's m 1 , . . . , m n on 2 S are interpreted as the probability distributions of the random subsets X 1 , . . . , X n of S , respectively (that is, the belief masses are interpreted probabilistically), then the combination of m 1 , . . . , m n is the probability distribution of X 1 ∩ · · · ∩ X n . The possible joint probability distributions of X 1 , . . . , X n correspond to the jba's J ∈ J(m 1 , . . . , m n ), and the resulting combination of m 1 , . . . , m n is m J . In particular, when the independence of X 1 , . . . , X n is assumed, the combination of m 1 , . . . , m n is m I (where I ∈ J(m 1 , . . . , m n ) is the jba corresponding to the independence of X 1 , . . . , X n ), but m I can be non-normal. Normalizing m I corresponds to conditioning on {X 1 ∩ · · · ∩ X n ∅}, but in general X 1 , . . . , X n are not independent anymore when conditioned on {X 1 ∩ · · · ∩ X n ∅}. Hence, the independence assumption and the normality of the combination are not compatible in general.
On the possibility of independence
Dempster [8] interpreted the belief masses probabilistically, and avoided the problem of the incompatibility between the independence assumption and the normality of the bba's by allowing non-normal bba's and including the normalization step in the definition of Bel, Pl, and Q. That is, Dempster defined the belief, plausibility, and commonality functions (under other names) associated with a bba m on 2 S as Bel n , Pl n , and Q n , respectively, where m n is the normalized version of m. This corresponds to using equivalence classes of bba's instead of bba's: an equivalence class contains all bba's leading to the same normal bba when normalized. In particular, the independence assumption poses no problem: the combination of the equivalence classes of bba's represented by m 1 , . . . , m n is the equivalence class of bba's represented by m I . If we use the normal bba's as representatives of the equivalence classes, then the combination of the normal bba's m 1 , . . . , m n is the normalized version of m I ; that is, we obtain Dempster's rule of combination. However, this mathematical expedient does not solve the real problem of the impossibility of independence for the normal bba's (on which Bel, Pl, and Q are based). Moreover, the approach with equivalence classes of bba's is not applicable when the independence is not assumed, because the normalized possible combinations of m 1 , . . . , m n (that is, the normalized versions of m J , for all jba's J ∈ J(m 1 , . . . , m n )) depend on the conflicts m 1 (∅), . . . , m n (∅) of the particular representatives of the respective equivalence classes.
In his monograph [41] , Shafer abandoned the probabilistic interpretation of the belief masses, and justified Dempster's rule of combination on intuitive grounds, by interpreting geometrically the independence of the information sources. However, this geometrical interpretation does not avoid the problem of the incompatibility between the independence assumption and the normality of the combination. Later [42] , Shafer gave a new interpretation of the belief masses, implicitly relying on fiducial probability, but it is not clear if fiducial inference is applicable for the combination of m 1 , . . . , m n when independence is assumed and m I (∅) > 0 (see for instance [27, 37] ). Hence, the question of the compatibility between the independence assumption and the normality of the combination remains open.
Smets [45] followed [41] in the non-probabilistic interpretation of the belief masses, and replaced the independence assumption by equivalent technical requirements. Like Dempster, Smets avoided the problem of the incompatibility with the normality of the bba's by allowing non-normal bba's, but differently from Dempster, he did not include the normalization step in the definition of Bel, Pl, and Q. However, all uses of the non-normal bba's (such as the decisions based on the pignistic transformation [48] ) seem to involve an explicit or implicit normalization, and under the usual closed-world assumption we recover Dempster's rule of combination. Hence, as in the approach with equivalence classes of bba's, the mathematical expedient of non-normality does not solve the real problem of the impossibility of independence for the normal bba's (on which all uses of the model seem to be actually based).
Approximating independence
In general, the normalization step in Dempster's rule of combination seems to be justified only as an approximation step: the result of the combination of m 1 , . . . , m n can be interpreted as the best approximation of m I by a normal bba on 2 S (this idea is studied also in [31] ). That is, in general Dempster's rule of combination corresponds to an assumption 6 of approximate independence; in particular, when the conflict m I (∅) is large, the reasonableness of that assumption can be questionable (because the approximation would be poor), and the result of Dempster's rule of combination can be rather arbitrary (compare with [41, page 254] ). Anyway, the independence assumption is always problematic, because the meaning of the dependence between the information sources is very abstract (this holds for all interpretations of the belief masses). For the same reason, the assumption of other specific dependence structures for the information sources (as described for example in [35] ) is usually even more problematic. In this paper we study combination rules for the situation in which no assumption is made about the dependence of the information sources.
On combination rules and their properties
Let m 1 , . . . , m n be n ≥ 1 normal bba's on 2 S . We study rules for combining m 1 , . . . , m n into a normal bba ⟨m 1 , . . . , m n ⟩ on 2 S , with ⟨m 1 ⟩ = m 1 when n = 1. Many combination rules have been proposed in the literature: see for instance [40, 47] for partial reviews. However, most of these rules require the independence of the information sources: exceptions are for example the combination rules proposed in [33, 29, 20, 1, 31, 35, 11, 13, 21, 28, 12] .
The above formulation imposes some strong constraints on the rules considered. First of all, the combination ⟨m 1 , . . . , m n ⟩ can only depend on the bba's m 1 , . . . , m n , while for example the rules studied in [33, 35, 21, 28] require additional information about the dependence of the information sources. Secondly, the combination ⟨m 1 , . . . , m n ⟩ must be defined for all finite, nonempty sets S , and all normal bba's m 1 , . . . , m n on 2 S , while for instance the rules proposed in [1, 25] impose constraints on S , and the rules studied in [29, 20, 11] are limited to particular classes of bba's. Finally, the combination ⟨m 1 , . . . , m n ⟩ must be a normal bba on 2 S , while for example the rules proposed in [6, 12] do not lead in general to a bba, and the rules studied in [45, 13] can lead to a non-normal bba.
It seems that no combination rule satisfying these three constraints without assuming the independence of the information sources has ever been published. However, we obtain such a rule if we generalize to all finite, nonempty sets S the combination rule proposed by Cattaneo [1] , if we extend also to dogmatic bba's the normalized cautious rule studied by Denoeux [11] , or if we completely specify (by introducing a second criterion after maximal expected cardinality) and normalize the combination suggested by Destercke et al. [13] .
Basic requirements
We are considering the combination of n bba's, without assuming that these are ordered in any particular way. Hence, a basic requirement for combination rules is commutativity: a rule is commutative if
for all permutations π of {1, . . . , n}. Most combination rules in the literature are binary: the combination of n bba's is obtained through n − 1 applications of the binary rule. The commutativity of the resulting n-ary combination rule is implied by the commutativity and associativity of the binary rule; hence, for binary rules associativity is also fundamental. Many binary rules proposed in the literature are commutative, but not associative: however, most of them could be extended to commutative n-ary combination rules. In general, associativity is not so fundamental for n-ary combination rules as it is for binary ones, but it can have important advantages from the computational point of view.
The simultaneous consideration of different frames of discernment on which the same beliefs are described is a central feature of Dempster-Shafer theory (see for example [41, 43] ). In particular, the ability of describing exactly the same information also on more refined frames of discernment is a fundamental property of the theory. In fact, if m is a bba on 2 S , and (R, r) is a refinement of S , then m and its vacuous extension m ↑(R,r) describe the same information, while for instance two probability distributions on R and S , respectively, cannot describe exactly the same information when |R| > |S |. Since a bba and its vacuous extensions describe the same information, they can be considered as equivalent. The original theory by Dempster and Shafer respects this equivalence, while surprisingly many methods proposed by other authors in the literature on Dempster-Shafer theory do not respect it. For example, the equivalence between a bba and its vacuous extensions is not respected by the pignistic transformation [48] or any other transformation of belief functions in probability distributions (such as those studied in [7, 3, 4, 5] ), by the second component of the measure of conflict proposed by Liu [34] , or by the combination rule suggested by Destercke et al. [13] . In fact, that 7 rule does not satisfy the basic requirement of equivariance with respect to vacuous extensions: a combination rule is equivariant with respect to vacuous extensions if
for all refinements (R, r) of S . This basic requirement implies in particular that all focal sets of ⟨m 1 , . . . , m n ⟩ are elements of the algebra of subsets of S generated by all focal sets of m 1 , . . . , m n (since m 1 , . . . , m n can be seen as vacuous extensions to 2 S of n bba's on that algebra of subsets). Hence, besides the above theoretical justification, the equivariance with respect to vacuous extensions can also have important advantages from the computational point of view. The combination rule proposed by Cattaneo [1] is equivariant with respect to vacuous extensions in the restricted framework of [1] , but in order to maintain this property when generalizing the rule to all finite, nonempty sets S , the measure of nonspecificity should be replaced with a more suitable measure of noncommitment.
Another central feature of Dempster-Shafer theory is that it generalizes propositional logic (see for example [9, 36, 30, 1] ). When a normal bba m on 2 S describes a piece of information about the uncertain value of x ∈ S , the proposition "x ∈ A" is certain according to that piece of information if and only if C(m) ⊆ A (that is, if and only if Bel(A) = 1). In propositional logic, the certainty of a proposition is preserved when new information is acquired. Hence, a combination rule generalizes propositional logic only if it satisfies the basic requirement of certainty preservation: a rule preserves certainty if
when the right-hand side is not empty (that is, when c min (m 1 , . . . , m n ) < 1). We could have restricted the definition of the combination rules to the case with c min (m 1 , . . . , m n ) < 1 (that is, the case in which all certainties described by m 1 , . . . , m n are compatible), but it is simpler to require ⟨m 1 , . . . , m n ⟩ to be defined even when c min (m 1 , . . . , m n ) = 1: for example as the vacuous bba on 2 S (we tacitly assume that this is the case for those rules that are usually not defined when c min (m 1 , . . . , m n ) = 1, such as Dempster's rule of combination). Certainty preservation is useful because it allows Dempster-Shafer theory to handle certain as well as uncertain knowledge, but it is important to underline that the degree of belief 1 should be assigned only to absolutely certain propositions. In particular, any combination rule that preserves certainty gives the same result as Dempster's rule of combination in the medical diagnosis example of Zadeh [55] . Even though it is the only reasonable result in that example (see for instance [43, 22, 23] ), several authors have suggested alternative combination rules in order to "correct" it (for example in [51, 18, 32, 25, 6, 26] ): of course, none of these rules preserves certainty.
Dempster's rule of combination satisfies the above three basic requirements (commutativity, equivariance with respect to vacuous extensions, and certainty preservation), and so do the combination rule proposed by Cattaneo [1] and the normalized cautious rule studied by Denoeux [11] , when suitably extended to the present framework. It is interesting to note that these basic requirements for n-ary combination rules are very similar to the criteria for binary rules considered by Smets [47, Section A.4] : that is, commutativity and associativity (implying the commutativity of the resulting n-ary combination rules), equivariance with respect to vacuous extensions (called "resistance to refinement"), a special case of certainty preservation (called "plausibility of false"), and two criteria strictly related to it ("duplicate conditioning" and "iterated conditioning").
Absorption and idempotency
All combination rules that have been proposed for the situation in which no assumption is made about the dependence of the information sources (such as the rules studied in [29, 20, 1, 11, 13, 12] ) seem to satisfy the property of idempotency: a rule is idempotent if
When the bba's m 1 , . . . , m n on 2 S are equal, they could describe exactly the same piece of information (in which case the sources would be completely dependent), or the information sources could be independent or have any other dependence structure. A combination rule that does not use additional information about the dependence of the sources cannot distinguish among these cases: the idempotency corresponds to the cautious choice of assuming that the total amount of information is the minimum possible. In fact, the total amount of information is minimal when 8 m 1 , . . . , m n describe exactly the same piece of information, and in this case ⟨m 1 , . . . , m n ⟩ = m 1 describes the combined information.
The cautious choice of assuming that the total amount of information is the minimum possible leads also to the more general property of absorption: a combination rule is absorbing if m 1 ∈ S(m n ) ⇒ ⟨m 1 , . . . , m n ⟩ = ⟨m 1 , . . . , m n−1 ⟩ for all n ≥ 2. In fact, if m 1 is a specialization of m n , then m 1 could describe the same information as m n plus some additional information. Hence, when the total amount of information is the minimum possible, the combined information of m 1 , . . . , m n−1 corresponds to the combined information of m 1 , . . . , m n . The property of absorption implies by induction that if m 1 is a common specialization of m 2 , . . . , m n , then ⟨m 1 , . . . , m n ⟩ = m 1 ; therefore, in particular, absorption implies idempotency. The property of absorption is satisfied by the combination rules studied in [20, 1, 13, 12] , but not by the idempotent rules proposed in [29, 11] . In particular, the following example shows that in the fundamental problem of the combination of two simple bba's, the cautious rule suggested by Denoeux [11] gives very often the same result as Dempster's rule of combination (that is, the result obtained when the two sources of information are assumed to be independent). Example 3. Let A, B be nonempty, proper subsets of S , and let α, β ∈ (0, 1) satisfy α ≥ β. If A ⊆ B, then the simple bba m A,α on 2 S is a specialization of the simple bba m B,β on 2 S , and therefore the combination of m A,α , m B,β is m A,α for any rule satisfying the property of absorption. By contrast, the cautious rule studied by Denoeux [11] (which in this situation corresponds to the conjunctive rule proposed by Kennes [29] ) gives the same result as Dempster's rule of combination when A B, and gives the result m A,α only when A = B.
Dempster's rule of conditioning and the minimum rule of possibility theory
Dempster's rule of conditioning is the special case of Dempster's rule of combination for two normal bba's m 1 , m 2 on 2 S when m 2 assigns the total belief mass 1 to a nonempty subset of S (that is, m 2 is either the vacuous bba on 2 S or a simple bba m A,1 on 2 S such that A ⊂ S is not empty). In this case, J(m 1 , m 2 ) is a singleton, because if m 1 , m 2 are interpreted as the probability distributions of the random subsets X 1 , X 2 of S , respectively, then X 1 , X 2 are certainly independent (since X 2 is constant a.s.), and therefore there is exactly one jba I with marginals m 1 , m 2 . Hence, when the belief masses are interpreted probabilistically (as in [8, 42] ), the result of Dempster's rule of conditioning can be justified as the best approximation of m I by a normal bba on 2 S (see Subsection 3.2), without need of any assumptions about the dependence of the information sources. When the belief masses are interpreted non-probabilistically (as in [41, 45] ), Dempster's rule of conditioning can be justified by considering specializations, which are a fundamental concept in Dempster-Shafer theory independently of the interpretation of the belief masses: see for example the expressions (2). As noted in Subsection 4.2, a specialization of a bba m can be interpreted as describing the same information as m plus some additional information; hence, it is natural to assume that the combination of m 1 , . . . , m n is a common specialization of m 1 , . . . , m n , or an approximation thereof. In the case of conditioning, Theorem 1 implies S(m 1 ) ∩ S(m 2 ) = S(m I ), and therefore m I is the most cautious choice of a common specialization of m 1 , m 2 , in the sense of describing the least possible amount of information. In fact, all other common specializations of m 1 , m 2 can be interpreted as describing more information than m I , since they are specializations of m I as well. Hence, the result of Dempster's rule of conditioning can be justified also as the best normal approximation of the least specialized common specialization of m 1 , m 2 (see also [47 
, Theorem 3.2]).
A combination rule generalizes Dempster's rule of conditioning if it gives the same result as Dempster's rule of combination in the case of conditioning (that is, in the case of combining two normal bba's m 1 , m 2 on 2 S such that m 2 assigns the total belief mass 1 to a nonempty subset of S ). In particular, Dempster's rule of conditioning is generalized (at least up to normalization) by the combination rules proposed in [29, 20, 1, 13, 12] for the situation in which no assumption is made about the dependence of the information sources. By contrast, the cautious rule suggested by Denoeux [11] does not generalize Dempster's rule of conditioning: the result of the combination of a non-separable bba m on 2 S with the vacuous bba on 2 S is not m (see [11, Propositions 8 and 9] ), in contrast with the usual interpretation of the vacuous bba as the bba describing no information. Non-separable bba's pose difficulties also with the interpretation of Denoeux's cautious rule (since the interpretation of negative weights of evidence is rather difficult, see also [21, Subsection 2.3]), and when restricted to separable bba's, Denoeux's cautious rule reduces to the conjunctive rule already studied by Kennes [29] (who notes that it was suggested by Smets). 9
The plausibility functions associated with the consonant bba's on 2 S correspond to the possibility measures on 2 S , considered in possibility theory [54, 17] . The usual (and most cautious) conjunctive combination rule in possibility theory is the minimum rule, which corresponds to combining the consonant bba's m 1 , . . . , m n on 2 S into the consonant bba on 2 S associated with the contour function π 1 ∧ · · · ∧ π n (or into its normalized version), where π 1 , . . . , π n are the contour functions associated with m 1 , . . . , m n , respectively, and ∧ is the pointwise minimum operator. It can be easily proved (by explicit construction, see for example [15, 19] ) that there is a jba J ∈ J(m 1 , . . . , m n ) such that m J is the result of the unnormalized version of the minimum rule of possibility theory (that is, m J is the consonant bba on 2 S associated with the contour function π 1 ∧ · · · ∧ π n ). Hence, Theorem 1 implies that m J is a common specialization of m 1 , . . . , m n , and Theorem 5 implies that Q J is the pointwise maximum of the commonality functions associated with the common specializations of m 1 , . . . , m n , since
for all nonempty A ⊆ S . Therefore, the result of the unnormalized version of the minimum rule of possibility theory is a least specialized common specialization of m 1 , . . . , m n (in the sense that it is not a specialization of another common specialization of m 1 , . . . , m n ), but the following simple example shows that in general the least specialized common specialization of m 1 , . . . , m n is not unique (hence, Theorem 4 of [20] is wrong). 
otherwise, and
otherwise. As noted above, it is natural to assume that the combination of m 1 , . . . , m n is a common specialization of m 1 , . . . , m n (or an approximation thereof), and when the least specialized common specialization of m 1 , . . . , m n is not unique, the usual ways of choosing a most cautious common specialization of m 1 , . . . , m n are by pointwise maximizing the associated plausibility or commonality functions (see for example [14, 50, 16, 24, 46, 20] ). When m 1 , . . . , m n are consonant, the result of the unnormalized version of the minimum rule of possibility theory is the unique common specialization of m 1 , . . . , m n pointwise maximizing the associated commonality function, while Example 4 shows that in general the common specialization of m 1 , . . . , m n pointwise maximizing the associated plausibility function is not unique. A combination rule generalizes the minimum rule of possibility theory if it gives the same result as the normalized version of that rule when m 1 , . . . , m n are consonant. In particular, the minimum rule of possibility theory is generalized (up to normalization) by the combination rules studied in [13, 12] (if we completely specify them in 10 a suitable way). By contrast, the combination rules proposed in [29, 1, 11] do not generalize the minimum rule of possibility theory: when applied to the situation of Example 4, the rules studied by Kennes [29] and Denoeux [11] give the same result (at least up to normalization) as Dempster's rule of combination, while the rule proposed by Cattaneo [1] gives the result m1 /2 .
Quasi-associativity
A property that can have important advantages from the computational point of view is quasi-associativity: a combination rule is quasi-associative if there are an associative binary operator ⋆ on a set F , a function f assigning to each normal bba on 2 S an element of F , and a function g on F such that
This definition basically corresponds to the idea of Yager [52] ; it implies in particular (g • f )(m) = ⟨m⟩ = m for all normal bba's m on 2 S (hence, f is an injection, and g is a quasi-inverse of f ). The computational advantages of quasi-associativity are related to the possibility of performing the actual combinations in the set F by means of the associative binary operator ⋆: the application of the function g can be interpreted as an approximation step, in the sense that f (⟨m 1 , . . . , m n ⟩) can be interpreted as the best approximation of f (m 1 ) ⋆ · · · ⋆ f (m n ) by an element of the image of f . An n-ary combination rule obtained through n − 1 applications of an associative binary rule is trivially quasi-associative (with f = g the identity function and ⋆ the binary rule); another example of quasi-associative combination rule is the one proposed by Daniel [6] , where the elements of F are generalized belief functions. Since the normalized version of the minimum rule of possibility theory is not associative, a combination rule generalizing the minimum rule of possibility theory cannot be associative, but it can be quasi-associative, as will be shown in the following section.
Two combination rules not requiring assumptions about the dependence of the information sources
Let m 1 , . . . , m n be n ≥ 1 normal bba's on 2 S , describing the information obtained from different sources, and consider the situation in which no assumption is made about the dependence of the information sources. When the belief masses are interpreted probabilistically (as in [8, 42] ), the combined information is described by a bba induced by some jba with marginals m 1 , . . . , m n , while as noted in Subsection 4.3, when the belief masses are interpreted non-probabilistically (as in [41, 45] ), it is natural to assume that the combined information is described by a common specialization of m 1 , . . . , m n . Hence, we have a set {m J : J ∈ J(m 1 , . . . , m n )} or S(m 1 ) ∩ · · · ∩ S(m n ) of bba's on 2 S possibly describing the combined information, and the usual way to proceed corresponds to the cautious choice of excluding the elements describing more information than is strictly necessary (see for example [16, 24, 46, 20] ). The resulting subsets depend on the exact definition of information content of a bba, but the usual definitions are compatible with the concept of specialization, in the sense that a more specialized bba is also more informative (see for instance [14, 50, 16, 24, 46, 20] ). Therefore, we can restrict attention to the two subsets of all least specialized elements of {m J : J ∈ J(m 1 , . . . , m n )} and S(m 1 ) ∩ · · · ∩ S(m n ), respectively: Theorem 1 implies that these two subsets are equal; that is, we have a subset of least specialized bba's on 2 S possibly describing the combined information, independently of the interpretation of the belief masses.
If there is a unique least specialized common specialization m s of m 1 , . . . , m n , then max J∈J(m 1 ,...,m n ) Pl J and max J∈J(m 1 ,...,m n ) Q J are the plausibility and commonality functions associated with m s , respectively, and we can consider the normalized version m of m s as a cautious combination of m 1 , . . . , m n : it can be interpreted as the best approximation of m s by a normal bba on 2 S (see Subsection 3.2), or equivalently Pl and Q can be interpreted as the best approximations of max J∈J(m 1 ,...,m n ) Pl J and max J∈J(m 1 ,...,m n ) Q J by a plausibility and a commonality functions associated with some normal bba's on 2 S , respectively. As noted in Subsection 4.3, when the least specialized common specialization of m 1 , . . . , m n is not unique, the usual ways of choosing a most cautious common specialization of m 1 , . . . , m n are by pointwise maximizing the associated plausibility or commonality functions. If there is a unique common specialization m s of m 1 , . . . , m n pointwise maximizing the associated plausibility function, then max J∈J(m 1 ,...,m n ) Pl J is the plausibility function associated with m s , and we can consider the normalized version m of m s as a cautious combination of m 1 , . . . , m n : it can be interpreted as the best approximation of m s by a normal bba on 2 S , or equivalently Pl can be interpreted as the best approximation 11 of max J∈J(m 1 ,...,m n ) Pl J by a plausibility function associated with some normal bba on 2 S . Analogously, if there is a unique common specialization m s of m 1 , . . . , m n pointwise maximizing the associated commonality function, then max J∈J(m 1 ,...,m n ) Q J is the commonality function associated with m s , and we can consider the normalized version m of m s as a cautious combination of m 1 , . . . , m n : it can be interpreted as the best approximation of m s by a normal bba on 2 S , or equivalently Q can be interpreted as the best approximation of max J∈J(m 1 ,...,m n ) Q J by a commonality function associated with some normal bba on 2 S . However, Example 4 and Theorem 4 imply that in general max J∈J(m 1 ,...,m n ) Pl J is not a plausibility function on 2 S , while the following example and Theorem 5 imply that in general max J∈J(m 1 ,...,m n ) Q J is not a commonality function on 2 S .
Example 5. In the situation of Example 1,
Therefore, Q 1 ∧ · · · ∧ Q n is not a commonality function on 2 S , because for instance
whereas all commonality functions Q on 2 S satisfy A⊆S (−1)
Hence, pointwise maximizing the associated plausibility or commonality functions does not always lead to a unique common specialization of m 1 , . . . , m n . To avoid this problem, we could consider a measure of information content that always allows to choose a unique least informative bba from a set of bba's on 2 S : if this measure is compatible with the concept of specialization (in the sense that a more specialized bba is also more informative), then Theorem 1 implies that the least informative bba in {m J : J ∈ J(m 1 , . . . , m n )} corresponds to the least informative bba in S(m 1 ) ∩ · · · ∩ S(m n ), and it can be easily proved that the combination rule obtained by considering the normalized version of that least informative bba as the combination of m 1 , . . . , m n would satisfy the properties of commutativity, quasi-associativity, idempotency, absorption, and certainty preservation, and would generalize Dempster's rule of conditioning. This is the approach followed for instance by Destercke et al. [13] , but their measure of information (based on expected cardinality) does not always allow to choose a unique least informative common specialization of m 1 , . . . , m n , and thus their combination rule is not completely specified (in another paper [12] , Destercke and Dubois consider sets of least informative bba's as possible results of combinations). In general, this approach has difficulties with the basic requirement of equivariance with respect to vacuous extensions (for example, the rule studied by Destercke et al. [13] does not satisfy that requirement), and the minimization of the measure of information can be computationally too demanding for many applications of the combination rule.
The idea of the present section is to consider as cautious combination of m 1 , . . . , m n a normal bba m on 2 S such that Pl can be interpreted as the best approximation of max J∈J(m 1 ,...,m n ) Pl J by a plausibility function associated with some normal bba on 2 S , even when max J∈J(m 1 ,...,m n ) Pl J is not a plausibility function on 2 S ; or alternatively, to consider as cautious combination of m 1 , . . . , m n a normal bba m on 2 S such that Q can be interpreted as the best approximation of max J∈J(m 1 ,...,m n ) Q J by a commonality function associated with some normal bba on 2 S , even when max J∈J(m 1 ,...,m n ) Q J is not a commonality function on 2 S . Hence, we need an approximation method more general than normalization: ideally, we could choose Pl and Q by minimizing some suitable measures of distance from max J∈J(m 1 ,...,m n ) Pl J and max J∈J(m 1 ,...,m n ) Q J , respectively, but the study of such distance measures and of algorithms for minimizing them goes beyond the scope of the present paper. In the following two subsections, we shall present results that hold for whole classes of approximation methods, and we shall only give two simple examples of approximation methods belonging to these classes.
The Pl-rule
We first consider the combination rule obtained by defining ⟨m 1 , . . . , m n ⟩ as the normal bba on 2 S associated with the plausibility function best approximating max J∈J(m 1 ,...,m n ) Pl J . The exact calculation of max J∈J(m 1 ,...,m n ) Pl J would be computationally too demanding for many applications of the rule, but the simple upper approximation Pl 1 · · · Pl n 12
suggested by Theorem 4 is exact when n ≤ 2, and often exact when n ≥ 3. Hence, we consider the combination rule obtained by defining ⟨m 1 , . . . , m n ⟩ as the normal bba on 2 S associated with the plausibility function best approximating Pl 1 · · · Pl n . Actually, the approximation by a plausibility function can be unnecessary in many applications, since the monotonic, subadditive function Pl 1 · · · Pl n on 2 S can be used directly to make inferences and decisions: for instance by simply comparing the values assigned by Pl 1 · · · Pl n to competing subsets of S , or more generally by comparing the nonadditive integrals (with respect to Pl 1 · · · Pl n ) of the utility or loss functions on S associated with competing decisions (see for example [10, 2] ).
Theorem 7. Let ξ be a function assigning to each µ ∈ MS 0 (S ) a normal bba on 2 S , and satisfying the following three conditions:
• if m is a bba on 2 S such that m(∅) < 1, then ξ(Pl) is the normalized version of m;
• ξ(µ •r) = (ξ(µ)) ↑(R,r) for all µ ∈ MS 0 (S ) and all refinements (R, r) of S ;
• C(ξ(µ)) ⊆ {x ∈ S : µ({x}) > 0} when the right-hand side is not empty, for all µ ∈ MS 0 (S ).
Then the combination rule defined by
satisfies the properties of commutativity, quasi-associativity, idempotency, absorption, equivariance with respect to vacuous extensions, and certainty preservation, and generalizes Dempster's rule of conditioning.
We call Pl-rule any combination rule of the form considered in Theorem 7, independently of the particular approximation method ξ. 
for all nonempty A ⊆ S , while if B⊆S : B ∅ m(B) = 0, then define ξ(µ) as the vacuous bba on 2 S . When µ is a plausibility function on 2 S , the bba m associated with µ can be obtained by calculating m(A) = 1 − µ(A) − B⊂A m(B) for each A ⊆ S , in order of increasing cardinality. Hence, the approximation method (6) satisfies the first condition of Theorem 7, and can be interpreted as simply enforcing the nonnegativity and normality of m also when µ is not a plausibility function. It can be easily proved that the approximation method (6) satisfies also the second and third conditions of Theorem 7, and that B⊆S : B ∅ m(B) = 0 in the algorithm (6) 
Therefore, Pl 1 · · · Pl n is not a plausibility function on 2 S , and the result of the Pl-rule depends on the approximation method. In the algorithm (6) we obtain m(∅) = 0, m({i}) = 1 2 for all i ∈ S , and m(A) = 0 for all A ⊆ S such that |A| ≥ 2. Hence, the result of the Pl-rule with the approximation method (6) is the bba m ′ on 2 S such that m ′ ({i}) = 1 n for all i ∈ S . In the situation of Example 3, the result of the Pl-rule is m A,α , independently of the approximation method, since the Pl-rule satisfies the property of absorption.
In the situation of Example 4, if A ∪ B = S , then Pl A, 1 /2 Pl B, 1 /2 = Pl1 /2 , and the result of the Pl-rule is m1 /2 , independently of the approximation method; while if A ∪ B ⊂ S , then Pl A, 1 /2 Pl B, 1 /2 is not a plausibility function on 2 S , and the result of the Pl-rule depends on the approximation method: with the method (6) the result is m1 /2 in this case too, since in the algorithm (6) we obtain m = m1 /2 . 13
The ∧Q-rule
We now consider the combination rule obtained by defining ⟨m 1 , . . . , m n ⟩ as the normal bba on 2 S associated with the commonality function best approximating max J∈J(m 1 ,...,m n ) Q J . An advantage over the Pl-rule is that max J∈J(m 1 ,...,m n ) Q J can be easily calculated as Q 1 ∧ · · · ∧ Q n thanks to Theorem 5, while a drawback is that the interpretation of commonality functions is less straightforward than the interpretation of plausibility functions, and in particular the approximation of Q 1 ∧ · · · ∧ Q n by a commonality function seems to be necessary in most applications (since usually the anti-monotonic, quasi-superadditive function Q 1 ∧ · · · ∧ Q n on 2
S cannot be used directly to make inferences and decisions). The expression (1) implies that this rule is strictly connected with Dempster's rule of combination, whose result can be interpreted as the normal bba on 2 S associated with the commonality function best approximating Q 1 · · · Q n ; and the expression (5) shows that the present rule can also be interpreted as a straightforward generalization of the minimum rule of possibility theory. Moreover, there is an interesting similarity with the normalized cautious rule studied by Denoeux [11] , where weight functions are used instead of commonality functions: an advantage of Denoeux's cautious rule is that no approximation method more general than normalization is necessary, while drawbacks are the problems with non-separable bba's (see Subsection 4.3) and the strange behavior outlined in Example 3.
Theorem 8. Let χ be a function assigning to each ν ∈ AQ 1 (S ) a normal bba on 2 S , and satisfying the following three conditions:
• if m is a bba on 2 S such that m(∅) < 1, then χ(Q) is the normalized version of m;
• χ(ν •r) = (χ(ν)) ↑(R,r) for all ν ∈ AQ 1 (S ) and all refinements (R, r) of S ;
• C(χ(ν)) ⊆ {x ∈ S : ν({x}) > 0} when the right-hand side is not empty, for all ν ∈ AQ 1 (S ).
satisfies the properties of commutativity, quasi-associativity, idempotency, absorption, equivariance with respect to vacuous extensions, and certainty preservation, and generalizes Dempster's rule of conditioning and the minimum rule of possibility theory.
We call ∧Q-rule any combination rule of the form considered in Theorem 8, independently of the particular approximation method χ. A simple example of approximation method satisfying the conditions of Theorem 8 is the following: for each A ⊆ S , in order of decreasing cardinality, define 
for all nonempty A ⊆ S , while if B⊆S : B ∅ m(B) = 0, then define χ(ν) as the vacuous bba on 2 S . When ν is a commonality function on 2 S , the bba m associated with ν can be obtained by calculating m(A) = ν(A) − B⊆S : A⊂B m(B) for each A ⊆ S , in order of decreasing cardinality. Hence, the approximation method (7) satisfies the first condition of Theorem 8, and can be interpreted as simply enforcing the nonnegativity and normality of m also when ν is not a commonality function. It can be easily proved that the approximation method (7) satisfies also the second and third conditions of Theorem 8, and that B⊆S : B ∅ m(B) = 0 in the algorithm (7) if and only if c min (m 1 , . . . , m n ) = 1.
Example 7. In the situation of Example 1, Q 1 ∧ · · · ∧ Q n is not a commonality function on 2 S (see Example 5) , and the result of the ∧Q-rule depends on the approximation method. In the algorithm (7) we obtain m(A) = 0 for all A ⊆ Ssuch that |A| ≥ 2, m({i}) = 1 2 for all i ∈ S , and m(∅) = 0. Hence, the result of the ∧Q-rule with the approximation method (7) is the bba m ′ on 2 S such that m ′ ({i}) = 1 n for all i ∈ S . In the situation of Example 3, the result of the ∧Q-rule is m A,α , independently of the approximation method, since the ∧Q-rule satisfies the property of absorption.
In the situation of Example 4, the result of the ∧Q-rule is the vacuous bba on 2 S , independently of the approximation method, since the ∧Q-rule generalizes the minimum rule of possibility theory.
Conclusion
In the present paper the problem of combining belief functions obtained from not necessarily independent sources of information has been studied. The minimal conflict of belief functions has been defined: it is a much better measure of disagreement among belief functions than the conflict of Dempster's rule of combination, which assumes the independence of the information sources.
Two combination rules for the situation in which no assumption is made about the dependence of the information sources have been proposed: the Pl-rule and the ∧Q-rule. They consist in approximating by a plausibility and a commonality functions the combinations Pl 1 · · · Pl n and Q 1 ∧ · · · ∧ Q n of the plausibility and commonality functions obtained from the information sources, respectively, where and ∧ are two simple commutative and associative binary operators. The proposed combination rules satisfy the properties of commutativity, quasi-associativity, idempotency, absorption, equivariance with respect to vacuous extensions, and certainty preservation, and generalize Dempster's rule of conditioning. Moreover, the ∧Q-rule generalizes the minimum rule of possibility theory, and is closely connected with both Dempster's rule of combination and the cautious rule studied by Denoeux [11] , but the Pl-rule has the advantage that the interpretation of plausibility functions is more straightforward than the interpretation of commonality functions.
As regards the approximations of Pl 1 · · · Pl n and Q 1 ∧ · · · ∧ Q n by a plausibility and a commonality functions, respectively, in the present paper only two simple algorithms have been proposed. Better algorithms would improve the Pl-rule and the ∧Q-rule: in particular, it would be interesting to have upper approximations of Pl 1 · · · Pl n and Q 1 ∧ · · · ∧ Q n by a plausibility and a commonality functions, respectively, such that the conditions of Theorems 7 and 8 are satisfied. Proof of Theorem 3. To prove that ∧ is a commutative and associative binary operator on AQ 1 (S ), it suffices to show that µ, ν ∈ AQ 1 (S ) implies µ∧ν ∈ AQ 1 (S ). Clearly, 0 ≤ µ∧ν ≤ 1, and since µ(∅) = ν(∅) = 1, we have (µ∧ν)(∅) = 
A. Proofs of theorems
Let A 1 , A 2 be subsets of 2 S such that A ⊆ (A 1 × 2 S ) ∪ (2 S × A 2 ), and define C = ∪ A 2 ∈2 S \A 2 A 2 . Then B C ⊆ A 1 , because B ∈ B C implies that there is an A 2 ∈ 2 S \ A 2 such that B ∩ A ∩ A 2 ∅, and thus B ∈ A 1 (since (B, A 2 ) ∈ A and A 2 A 2 ). If A 2 ∈ 2 S \ A 2 , then A 2 ⊆ C and so A 2 B C ; that is, B C ⊆ A 2 . Moreover, the third condition for χ implies that the combination rule preserves certainty. Moreover, the rule generalizes Dempster's rule of conditioning, because in the case of conditioning, Q 1 ∧ Q 2 = Q I follows from Theorem 5 (where I is the unique jba with marginals m 1 , m 2 ), and thus the first condition for χ implies that ⟨m 1 , m 2 ⟩ = χ(Q 1 ) is the normalized version of m I (when m I (∅) < 1). Finally, the first condition for χ implies also that the combination rule generalizes the minimum rule of possibility theory, since when m 1 , . . . , m n are consonant, Q 1 ∧ · · · ∧ Q n is the commonality function associated with the result of the unnormalized version of that rule, as follows from the expression (5).
